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The Political Impact of Trade in Chiefdoms

Trade theories of state formation have failed to specify trade as market behavior, and to appreciate the political role of imported luxury goods in chiefdoms. When luxury goods and other valuable commodities become available through the market rather than through interpersonal, chiefly exchanges, the elite's power depends increasingly on economic exploitation and the control of arms. Archeological data from several locales illustrate the disruptive and formative effects of trade diasporas in chiefdoms.

"THE PROBLEM OF STATE FORMATION," DECLARED ONE BURNT-OUT participant in an invited session on that topic, "has become overworked in the anthropological literature, a theoretical obsession that runs the risk of yielding no new insights and producing little more than hackneyed generalizations which are unlikely to spawn innovative research" (Kohl 1987a:21). Contrary to that pessimism, we see a measure of consensus on what are the problem's important elements, and in the remaining riddles of state formation, a significant incentive and guide for research in archeology and ethnology. This article synthesizes insights from recent archeological research, world systems theory, and Marxist anthropology to suggest a new way of thinking about the role of trade in secondary state formation.

True, older theories of state formation that focused on one or a few causal variables—irrigation, resource concentration, militarism, or trade—have given way to less certitude and clarity. It appears that there may well have been "different routes" to statehood in different places (Haas 1982:209; see also Cohen 1978a:8; Flannery 1972; Hindess and Herst 1975:40). Cohen describes as "self-limiting" a process that begins from different initial conditions, but through a "funnel-like progression of interactions" converges eventually into a similar form: centralized polities that rule through the threat or exercise of force (1978b:142). While suggesting that the role of trade in political centralization deserves a second look, especially as it interacts with other variables, we are not suggesting a return to monocausal, unilinear explanations, nor defining the state as "an abstract configuration of institutions with universal properties" (Gledhill and Rowlands 1982:146). For us, too, the issue will be, simply, "about the evolution of new forms of dominance mechanisms" (Gledhill and Rowlands 1982:146).

Starting with V. Gordon Childe (1936, 1942), many theorists have suggested that trade is a critical variable in the emergence of the state. (See Haas 1982 for a recent review and appraisal of trade and other theories of state formation.) Some trade theories have addressed the genesis of primary states (e.g., Johnson 1973; Rathje 1971, 1972; Wright and Johnson 1975); others have suggested that trade was important in spawning secondary states (e.g., Adams 1974; Posnansky 1973; Webb 1974, 1975). While we examine the role of trade in secondary state formation, we do not interpret trade merely as a mechanism of diffusion but find its impact in the local and regional political economy. Indeed, the effects of trade and the market in some primary states are no doubt similar to what we

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suggest here, and given the newer multicausal models of state formation, the primary/secondary distinction appears much less important than it once did (Haas 1981:83; cf. Haas 1982:4–5; Yoffee 1979).

Whether a particular archeological culture represents a chiefdom or a state is not infrequently disputed. Theories of primary states that trace their beginnings from "formative" periods of population growth and an ever-mounting centralization of power portray a gradual process. Over time, cumulative changes result in a "quantum leap" into a new kind of polity (Earle 1987:281; Fried 1967:239). It is reasonable to assume, however, that in secondary state formation, the main focus of our attention here, the transition was often relatively abrupt, as a chiefdom or ranked society was propelled into statehood through direct or indirect contact with a previously existing state.

In our view, the significant difference between chiefdom and state is not simply a scalar difference of size, nor the distinction between local sovereignty versus incorporation into translocal polities (c.f. Carniero 1970, 1981; Price 1978). Rather, the *source* of political authority changes. As Webb put it, the problem is how the monopolization of force and of the wealth that makes it possible emerge in social organizations that inhibit the concentration of power and the accumulation of wealth (1975:157). It is not necessary to phrase this novelty as one involving the *monopoly* of power; sufficient is a "paramount control" over local systems that may retain some prerogatives to use force on their own (Carniero 1981:68; Yoffee 1979). Still, the issue is conceptualizing how the concentration of force emerged.

Carniero and others have argued that centralization at the expense of local autonomy happens only through a process of coercion. The maintenance of force presupposes a concomitant amassment of wealth. The question becomes, then, how to conceptualize the concentration of *wealth* in societies where "economic power . . . [is] a function of the generalized leadership role, rather than the reverse" (Webb 1975:180), societies where leaders' accumulation of wealth was once checked by the pressure to be generous toward followers (Webster 1975:446).

Theories of the state frequently posit that control of economic processes—either productive or distributive—is the essential source of stately power (Engels 1972; Fried 1967:186 ff.). Trade theories of state formation describe trade as a valuable resource requiring administrative overview and protection by force. Assumed or explained is the idea that rulers use the profits from trade to pay for a standing force of arms that can then be used to further monopolize or control trade, to wage warfare with outsiders, and to extract labor and surplus production from followers (Friedman and Rowlands 1978; Haselgrove 1987:106–107; Posnansky 1973; Price 1978; Rathje 1972; Webb 1975:179).

Older theories were often predicated on an image of trade in staples between areas of uneven availability (e.g., Childe 1936; Rathje 1971; Wright and Johnson 1975). Trade in luxury goods was poorly integrated in these theories. Tourtellot and Sabloff, for example, distinguished between trade goods that are Useful (of practical value) as opposed to Functional (of state or ritual value), proposing that trade in Useful products was an incentive for state formation in highland Mexico. Trade in Functional products was "not critical" in the transformation of ranked societies into states, they conclude (1972:132). Rathje (1971) and Price (1978) reach similar conclusions.

Some recent writers, however, focus on the effects of trade in "preciosities" or sumptuary goods (e.g., Blanton and Feinman 1984; Friedman and Rowlands 1978). Gledhill and Rowlands caution that significant interregional exchanges cannot be reduced to material flows (1982:147). Luxury goods obtained from distant sources are often distributed to reproduce a system of rank, status, or offices within a polity (Frankenstein and Rowlands 1978). Schneider contends that the luxury goods that welded alliances and secured clients' loyalties were "no less critical than food" to the "mobilization of energy" in precapitalist polities (1977:23, 27). This suggests that luxury goods may have greater weight in a political economy than their comparatively small volume would imply. In fact, we

will argue here that the trade in preciosities frequently provides an important key to understanding that qualitative shift in the moral basis of power that characterizes the state.

Our argument presupposes, however, that the word "trade" must be used carefully and in a quite specific sense. Many writers speak of trade as broadly synonymous with exchange, using these terms interchangeably (e.g., Beale 1973; Ericson and Earle 1982; Renfrew 1969:152, 1975). Against this tendency, a few have argued for distinguishing trade as one kind of exchange (e.g., Claessen 1978:541; Kohl 1978:486). In Adams's terms, trade implies "risk-taking, profit-motivated, entrepreneurial behavior" (Adams 1974:239; see also Rowlands 1987:5–6). Exchange may be direct or indirect, but trade tends to be indirect, accomplished through middlemen (Alden 1982), and some use the term trade especially to speak of long-distance exchanges (c.f. Rowlands 1987:4, 8).

Because the word "trade" has denoted a wide range of exchange relationships, from hand-to-hand "trickle-trade," to redistribution, to long-distance organized trade (Beale 1973), generalizations about its significance in state formation have been blurred and contradictory. Some writers have seen "trade" as crucial in state formation; others have disagreed. Skalnik (1978) concludes that it is doubtful that the control of "trade" and the market has a causal connection with the rise of the state, pointing out that only in the most advanced form of early states do private property and a market economy develop. In the same volume, however, Claessen's tabular comparison of 21 cases of state development shows that long-distance "trade" was important in most of these, as were markets (1978:543). Even one of the most consistent trade theorists, Webb, does not distinguish between the long-distance exchanges that were embedded in interpersonal chiefly relations and trade for the market (e.g., Webb 1975:180–83). Observing the different ways "trade" appears in archeological theories, Barbara Price concluded that the people talking about trade are frequently discussing quite different phenomena. We concur with Price: "Unless the relevant conditions of its operation are stipulated, it becomes somewhat less than informative to offer this parameter [i.e., trade] as an explanation" (Price 1978:174). (See also Hodder 1980.)

Even when authors use "trade" and "exchange" interchangeably, most anthropological writers recognize that "professional trade and commerce" were absent or largely so from primitive and prehistoric communities (Dalton 1975:104; Renfrew 1969; Sahlins 1972:289; Wallerstein 1974). The word "trade" should denote only those exchanges embedded in the market, speaking here of the market as process rather than place. As Polanyi's (1957) work elucidates, the market operates largely through impersonal considerations of value based on supply and demand, as well as on the presumption of profit/value maximization between parties. Whenever these principles guide exchanges, we may speak of trade or the market, and no doubt "the market," in this wide sense, has characterized at least some human interactions from earliest times. Polanyi was correct, however, to point out that only in relatively recent history has the market come to predominate as the mechanism of exchange, outweighing—but never extinguishing—other forms of economic interaction (Sahlins 1972:301).

Polanyi's ideas found a ready audience among archeologists and ethnologists. Yoffee (1979) complains of the "taxonomic trap" into which we can fall from the slavish application of Polanyi's distinctions, saying, "In this scheme redistribution is identified with chiefdoms, markets with states (Cohen and Schlegel 1968; Fried 1967; Service 1975; many others)" (Yoffee 1979:25). In fact, not one of these sources Yoffee cites actually articulates in any detail the relationship between states and markets. At best they only allude to such a relationship (e.g., Fried 1967:196). Most discussion of Polanyi's categories relative to state formation has, in fact, explored the role of *redistribution* in early states (e.g., Dalton 1969:73), partly because Polanyi himself underestimated the significance of the market in "archaic" states such as those of Mesopotamia (Gledhill and Larsen 1982; Lamberg-Karlovsky 1975).

Marxist theories are usually cited linking statehood to the market, but the relationship of state and market is underarticulated in this theoretical tradition as well, partly because

Marxist theories emphasize the organization of *production,* specifically differential ownership of productive property, rather than that of exchange (Claessen and Skalnik 1978:6–9; Hindess and Herst 1975:261–262; Rowlands 1987:3). Trade is not easily assimilated into Marxian theory (Moseley and Wallerstein 1978). World systems theory, in contrast, is exchange-focused, but Wallerstein equates market trade with capitalism (Wallerstein 1974:391; c.f. Wolf 1982:298). Moseley and Wallerstein (1978) recognize Polanyi's types of exchange, and praise Fried for positing the way "exploitation replaces distribution" in political evolution, but they do not systematically draw the links between state and market.

In short, the significance of trade as *market* behavior has been insufficiently recognized in virtually all theories of state formation. Despite much talk about "trade" as a significant variable, the word has been used for so broad a range of exchange behavior that its role remains inconclusive. Furthermore, the relation of market and trade to the state remains unexplicated even in those traditions—Marxist approaches and world systems theory—that would seem most amenable to such an analysis. Tracing the impact of trade entails understanding first the relationship between preciosities and power in chiefdoms.

The Symbols and Sources of Power in Chiefdoms

Carniero suggests we set aside the notion of redistribution to "seek the source of power that permitted a chief actually to tax his subjects and not just give back to them the goods they had previously brought him" (1981:63). Service's influential notion that "chiefdoms are redistributive societies" (1962:134) has not stood up under empirical investigation (Carniero 1981:61–63; Earle 1977), partly because "redistribution" has been used to describe everything from the circulation of subsistence commodities at the hands of Melanesian big-men to the appropriation of tribute and taxes by chiefs and kings.

Recent research on chiefdoms indicates that elites often maintain their superordinate position by monopolizing intersocietal exchanges through which prestige markers and luxury goods change hands (Earle 1987). Substantial similarities often appear among luxury goods and prestige markers, ritual paraphernalia, burial treatment, and monumental architecture (e.g., Braun 1986, Brose and Greber 1979, Caldwell 1964, Hall 1977 [Hopewell]; Brown 1975, 1976 [Mississippian]; Flannery 1968 [Olmec]; Shennan 1982 [Bell Beaker]). These similarities frequently cross-cut wide regions and politically autonomous societies where the material culture of the non-elite majority varies noticeably by locale. Styles of architecture and burial treatment diffuse along with portable imports, and like them, create and index status differences. To the extent that luxuries trickle downward within a society and outward, they are part of the essential currency on which political power rests.

Some imported items are employed as "political currency," that is, their distribution forges the loyalties of clients which ultimately translate into a chief's ability to mobilize labor, encourage surplus production, and call up defensive forces (Freidel 1986; Friedman and Rowlands 1978; Schneider 1977). Schneider suggests that patron-client ties within a polity also diffuse organized opposition from below: "Pitting some against others, gift-giving promotes the co-optation of class enemies, making the patron-client relationship a forceful political adjunct to energy capture" (1977:23). Sometimes items imported from distant locales may be essential to elite claims of access to supernatural powers on which the society depends (Helms 1979). Still other imported goods leave the chiefdom through channels similar to those through which they entered, and so create or lubricate the intersocietal networks between elites on which chiefly power partly rests.

It seems clear that most of the exchanges between prehistoric chiefs were face-to-face direct exchanges rather than effected via traders or a specialized merchant class (e.g., Renfrew and Cherry 1986; Spencer 1982). In the Late Bronze Age of Syria and Palestine, for example, intersocietal exchange was carried out among local rulers who phrased their relations in a kinship idiom and symbolized these connections through gift exchanges

underlain by the moral requirement to reciprocate. Failure to exchange goods was tantamount to renouncing bonds of kinship and resulted in exclusion from Late Bronze Age court society (Liverani 1987:67–69; Zaccagnini 1987:58–64).

The reciprocal nature of chiefly exchange, embedded in role obligations rather than the market, is essential for conceptualizing how full-blown *trade* is implicated in state formation. In the absence of specialized traders, luxury goods changed hands for reasons personal and political: as wedding gifts, funeral offerings, and other life-crisis gifts between "kin," and also through reciprocal gift-giving between leaders, as tokens of apology, invitation, treaty, or alliance (e.g., Dalton 1977; Grierson 1971; Spencer 1982). Schortman and others have suggested that the personal bonds between dispersed chiefs might have resembled an exclusive "ethnic" identity (Freidel 1979, 1986; Schortman 1989; Schortman and Urban 1987), the boundary of which would have limited access to the goods that defined chiefly status. A kinlike or ethnic bond would have cushioned the delayed returns and perpetual imbalances of reciprocal exchanges between distant partners.

Resource concentration or other precipitating conditions might have given rise to endogenous development toward the state in a few areas (Carniero 1970; Renfrew 1975), but pristine states then became factors to which nearby polities had to adjust. Carniero stresses the role of warfare in this process of state expansion and the reactive generation of secondary states, but markets are as aggressively expansive as state polities. Blanton and Feinman relate that controlling the flow of preciosities was a major motivation for Aztec imperialism, and that one region's conquest followed complaints by Aztec lapidaries that "the prices they had to pay for raw materials were too high" (1984:677). An inherently expansive market must have played a major role in the generation of secondary states from chiefdoms, and not simply in polities contiguous to states, but, as Curtin's (1984) work suggests, as far away as traders could reach. Once prestige goods or valuable commodities such as salt became transferable through the market, their high value justified the high-risk trade diasporas Curtin has described so well. Just as the forces of the European market pushed legions of explorers and fortune seekers abroad and drew "the people without history" into its realm (Wolf 1982), so in earlier eras and other regions trade diasporas must have had similar effects.

One of the important insights of world systems theory is the way economic networks run away from political boundaries. A market economy, as Dalton put it, is "highly decentralized" (1961). The contemporary capitalist world system is an economic unity that transcends the national and ideological boundaries that separate peoples. Schneider (1977) criticizes Wallerstein for assuming that in precapitalist empires economic hegemony and political control were isomorphic. Certainly the long-distance transport of valuables traversed empire boundaries, but Wallerstein assumes that only trade in essential staples, not luxury goods, generates that regional interdependency characteristic of a world system (1974:398).

We agree with Schneider (1977) that precapitalist regional trade, including the trade in luxury items, also ran ahead or away from the empires that were its centers. The extent to which empires could or wanted to control trade varied. Through sumptuary laws restricting the use of status symbols, elites controlled the traffic in luxuries within their polities (Blanton and Feinman 1984:676), but merchants wealthy enough to buy armed forces must have had frequently uneasy relationships with governors (e.g., Hassig 1985). Several writers have noticed that where empires did maintain central control of commerce, traders flourished all the more strongly at the peripheries or beyond the borders (Gailey and Patterson 1987; La Lane 1982; Patterson 1987).

At the other end, the chiefs and headmen who were drawn into trade on the peripheries of empires must have found that they were not entirely able to control the effects of trade in their polities and regions. Commercial market exchange would pose problems to chiefly organization and disrupt existing sociopolitical patterns (Friedman and Rowlands 1978:232; Haselgrove 1982:81). The market does not displace chiefly gift-giving, but

chiefs who are contacted by the expanding tentacles of a trade network soon find that they must play by new rules in order to stay in the status game. State-based traders would create demands for locally produced goods, and so new sources of wealth, while introducing, too, new commodities for sale. If the goods that define and maintain high status—goods once the prerogative of chiefs in an interlocking but restricted network of reciprocal partnerships—become available for a price, then chiefs must restrict access to these goods by novel means. They must try to ensure that only *they* can pay the price. Status and wealth become linked all the more strongly, and new levels of coercion also come into play.

The association of trade with militarism is widely recognized. While Curtin does not suggest the link between trade diasporas and the process of state formation, he notes that the former operate only through "protection costs" extracted through implied or actual coercion (Curtin 1984:41). Merchants can also control their own military forces to defend themselves, but then they possess the ability to plunder and raid as well as trade. In any case, chiefs must either "protect" traders from theft and piracy, or protect themselves from pirate-traders, and so must command a force of arms. The loyalty of this force is "bought" partly through the goods of the very trade network it protects, but the new force can also be used within to demand greater tribute and labor from subordinates so as to spur and then appropriate greater surplus production.

Chiefly power has already rested in the appropriation of surplus. Some was returned to followers through feasting, while some supported the chief's external alliances and gained him symbols of elite rank. In this new status game chiefs must extract enough surplus to pay the "protection costs" of mercantile activities. This new degree of exploitation helps ensure at the same time that their followers cannot amass the market price of the luxuries and other goods that define power. Thus, the link between trade and the state is not simply that trade provides the surplus wealth that permits chiefs to "hire war bands" (Webb 1975), nor only that the trade requires military protection, but also that trade introduces the requirement that leaders minimize the likelihood that others will get rich enough to compete with them for power.

This is not to imply a conscious chiefly strategy to systematically impoverish commoners and their elite competitors, but rather to suggest that the expansion of "the market" into wider and wider spheres has the inevitable effect of reducing the competition for status and power to the competition over wealth. To the degree that status and influence can be bought rather than inherited or achieved on other grounds, the economic exploitation of others minimizes the competition.

How often this scenario occurred and how important it was in specific transitions to the state remain to be tested against historical and archeological data. The exchange and dispersement of luxury goods was not equally important in all chiefdoms (Friedman and Rowlands 1978:315). We cannot assume, given the different routes to state formation, that states and the market inevitably imply each other. La Lane (1982), for example, insists that the Inca empire had, at its center, a non-market economy. Conversely, markets can operate in the absence of states (Bohannon and Dalton 1962). While arguing here for the transformative impact of trade in some proto-states, we nonetheless recognize, as Polanyi did, the simultaneity or coexistence of different kinds of exchange in the same economy. But it is true, nonetheless, that market exchange, as a social and moral phenomenon based on a "double competition" of buyer and seller (Sahlins 1972:297) and not rationalized with reference to mutual obligation, benefits from sources of control external to the exchange, namely, from formal systems of law enforcement and dispute adjudication.

This model of trade in the emergence of secondary states will be confirmed in the archeological record to the extent that, first, we can distinguish commercial trade from tribute and chiefly reciprocal exchanges, second, we discern following the introduction of trade a widening of the gap between elite and non-elite, and third, we see the concentration of greater coercive powers in elite hands.

The first of these criteria is the most important, because the significance of the other two depend on it. La Lane's (1982) careful scrutiny of ethnohistorical references to Inca "markets" and "traders" shows that recognizing trade as such can be difficult even with written records. Collis (1971) warns similarly that coins do not always index market trade.

The Effects of Trade Diasporas on Chiefdoms: Archeological Examples

Recent analyses of interregional trade between Iron Age European chiefdoms and contemporary Mediterranean civilizations document the extension of trading diasporas from the Mediterranean states into western and central Europe (Dyson 1985; Haselgrove 1987; Hedeager 1987; Wells 1980, 1984). First Greek and later Roman merchants encountered relatively simple ranked societies characterized by efficient subsistence agriculture and little centralization of political control. These diaspora traders sought basic staples, such as grain and metals, for which they gave olive oil, wine, decorated pottery, bronze vessels, and silver in return, items that served as important status markers in northern societies. These trade contacts had several major effects on European chiefdoms. They upset local balances of power both among chiefs and between chiefs and their followers through the introduction of large quantities of goods that symbolized high status. Chiefs responded to the opportunities presented by Mediterranean merchants by putting pressure on local systems of subsistence production to increase marketable surplus (Haselgrove 1987:105–106; Hedeager 1987:127; Wells 1984:160–169). In short, contact with the Mediterranean diasporas set enterprising northern chiefs into competition to control the large flow of new imports into the region, a competition that placed a high premium on generating local surpluses to be used in the southern trade.

In some cases, as with the trade between central Europeans and the Greek trading colony of Massalia (ca. 600–480 B.C.), chiefs moved to ensure their monopoly of imports by restricting contact with the Greeks to certain times and places and excluding all non-elite from such interactions (Wells 1980:76, 78–79). Imports were used for display and as gifts to attract and hold followers. These supporters were then obligated to produce marketable surpluses in exchange for the luxuries passed down to them by their patrons. The more successful a patron was in attracting a band of supporters, the more surplus he could control, the more luxury goods he could capture in the Mediterranean trade, and hence the larger number of supporters he could attract (Haselgrove 1987:105–106; Hedeager 1987:127; Wells 1980:87, 93, 96–99, 102–103; 1984:113, 160, 169). In short, the rich got richer and the poor became their clients.

The Greek trade spawned an increasing political centralization in Europe. A few skillful chiefs attracted very large followings. Their settlements grew into sizable towns dominating extensive hinterlands of producers. The archeological record shows the appearance of chiefly graves in which the elaborateness of offerings and construction dwarf anything known previously in the area (Wells 1980:76; 1984:111–112, 123–124). The recovery of almost all imports found in central Europe within these few imposing interments implies that their owners were monopolizing control of the southern trade. Smaller amounts of luxury items found in poorer settlements and graves point to the use of these goods both to attract non-elite followings and to motivate surplus production from them.

The evidence from the period of Roman trade is also suggestive. In western Europe in the first century B.C., Roman imports were deposited in ritual caches, suggesting that they were sacrificed to the gods and were under communal control. As contact with Roman merchants increased, however, and the amounts of luxury goods in circulation grew, these items begin to appear more and more in individual graves. By A.D. 1–200 only a relatively few graves contain large numbers of imports, indicating that single leaders within particular areas were succeeding in monopolizing the acquisition of Roman imports for their own benefit (Haselgrove 1987:130). Wealth was concentrated in a few hands, and there is evidence of increasing political centralization, which eventually came to threaten the existence of Rome itself (Dyson 1985:275).

The extent to which these developments depended on foreign trade in luxuries is reflected in their rapid reversal in 480 B.C., when the Greek traders of Massalia shifted their operations to the Po Valley. The loss of access to luxuries among northern chiefs undercut their ability to control and stimulate surplus production and attract large followings. Political centralization and town growth ceased, and the area reverted to an earlier pattern of largely self-sufficient villages with weakly marked status differences (Wells 1980:103; 1984:115, 125).

North European leaders in Iron Age Europe who were in contact with Rome drew on their followings for both tradeable surpluses and military support. These bands of supporters were well-organized and armed, and could be used both to raid for plunder and slaves and to threaten local producers into paying tribute in exchange for "protection" (Hedeager 1987:133, 138–139; Wells 1984:178). The results of these military operations, whether for tribute or booty, were then used to reward followers and to secure desired luxury goods through trade. War and commerce went hand-in-hand, and the military power of a chief could be used to ensure his continued control over the import trade. The case for the earlier period of Greek interaction with temperate Europe is less clear, but there is evidence of an increasing number of armaments appearing in burials throughout the contact period (Wells 1980:83–84). This suggests that the scale and level of military organization and operations were growing, possibly as a means to secure goods through raiding and maintain exclusive chiefly control of imports.

Teotihuacan in the Mexican highlands was a focus of state-level development between A.D. 200–700, during which time its residents established trading colonies in various parts of Mesoamerica, including one at Kaminaljuyu, a complex chiefdom centered in the Valley of Guatemala (Kidder, Jennings, and Shook 1946; Michels 1979; Sanders 1977; Sanders and Michels 1977; Santley 1987). The presence of a permanently resident group of Teotihuacanos is indicated for the period A.D. 400–600 by the rapid construction of a sizable building complex (Group F-IV-2 in Michels 1979; Mounds A and B in Kidder, Jennings, and Shook 1946) built in a locally unprecedented style that closely mimics forms attested commonly at Teotihuacan. Artifacts associated with this complex also diverge from their local counterparts in the direction of Teotihuacan patterns. There is no evidence to suggest that Teotihuacan conquered Kaminaljuyu. The most plausible interpretation is that the foreign presence in the Valley of Guatemala represents the residence of merchants within a Teotihuacan-based diaspora (Michels 1979; Santley 1987).

The appearance of the presumed Teotihuacan merchant community at Kaminaljuyu coincides with marked changes in the form and organization of the site, and it is hard not to see the two sets of events as interrelated. Specifically, all ten of the previously occupied elite residential/administrative/ceremonial complexes at the center were abandoned and new buildings took their place (Michels 1979:198–199). Further, two major building complexes, C-II-4 and C-II-14, dominate the site, being larger than all other constructions and built in a general Teotihuacan style. This suggests political centralization in which only certain members of the local elite enjoyed a rapid growth of power and prestige, a growth at least partially founded on contact with the resident Teotihuacanos. That these rulers attempted to monopolize control over Teotihuacan contacts and imports is suggested by the isolation of Group F-IV-2 in the far southeast corner of the site, and a shift toward elite control over the manufacture of exotic craft goods that might have played a role in the Teotihuacan trade. Previously, production of these items was more evenly distributed among both elite and non-elite households (Michels 1979:193, 198, 203, 209). After the withdrawal of Teotihuacan contact in ca. A.D. 600, Kaminaljuyu reverted to a social and political organization reminiscent of its earlier periods. Sizes of monumental platform complexes suggest a power dispersal among a number of more-or-less equal elite households. In fact, the period of Teotihuacan contact with the Guatemalan highlands produced an anomaly in Kaminaljuyu's pattern of development which is expunged with the withdrawal of that influence (Michels 1979:210–211).

Examples of these processes of contact could be cited from other parts of the world as well. Recent studies of mid-third millennium B.C. trade between Mesopotamian states

and simpler societies within the Iranian highlands suggest that these contacts also disrupted preexisting highland social forms leading to greater specialization of production and political centralization (Kohl 1978:471–472, 488; 1979:78–79; 1987b:15–16). Here the Mesopotamian states exported basic staples, especially foodstuffs, while the highland peoples produced large surpluses of raw material subsequently transformed into status markers by specialist craftmakers in the lowlands. Similarly, Middle Bronze Age trading firms organized around single large families from Assur established merchant colonies in Anatolia at such centers as Kanesh. These Assyrian diasporas traded in high volumes of luxury goods, such as silver, zinc, and textiles, which served as status markers within the small polities of Anatolia. These economic activities, too, apparently disrupted local sociopolitical and economic patterns, perhaps setting off struggles to control foreign trade which resulted in increased political centralization and, ultimately, the formation of the Hittite state (Larsen 1987:49–55).

Conclusion

None of the elements in this model of the transition to the state is entirely new. The nature of non-market economies, the symbolic value of luxury goods in chiefly polities, the extraction of surplus production by chiefs, the appearance of trade diasporas, and the extraction of surplus through the threat of force in state-level polities—all of these are now commonplace in anthropology and archeology. The emphasis and combination of these elements in a new way, however, depicts the dynamic of the transition from chiefdom to secondary state more clearly than before.

First, the term "trade" should be used precisely for entrepreneurial behavior, a form of exchange qualitatively different from those entailed by personal obligation. Otherwise, the political significance of trade compared to other forms of exchange remains obscure (Hodder 1980). Second, we have argued that the significance of trade is deeper than simply being a new source of wealth over which leaders contend and with which they can buy power. Rather, trade destabilizes the political economy of chiefdoms based on personalistic bonds of clientage and alliance cemented through exchanges.

Philip Curtin's *Cross-Cultural Trade in World History* (1984) describes the various trade diasporas that tied together vast regions of the world in historic times through a network of trade settlements. Curtin persistently fails to understand non-market forms of exchange. He sees "trade" in every archeological manifestation of goods that appear to have traveled long distances and spanned social boundaries. He envisions the very earliest trade, for example, as relay trade, "carried on by people who bought and sold without going far from home" (1984:17). The point, rather, is to understand mechanisms for moving goods, and sometimes, as in the Kula Ring, over great distances, which would not have them "bought and sold" at all (e.g., Spencer 1982). Curtin does not grasp the essence of reciprocal economies, that is, that people give and receive certain things, indeed most things, because this exchange is part of what defines their relationship.

Because he subsumes all exchange under "trade," Curtin misses seeing the political significance of the very phenomenon to which he draws our attention. Trade diasporas were not just a powerful new vehicle for cultural diffusion: they represent an intensification of market behavior, and one intimately linked to the use of force and thus the appearance of states (c.f. Webb 1975; Wheatley 1975).

Our view of the relationship between "the market" and the state both draws and diverges from world systems and Marxist theories. Marxist theories point to the state as the political edifice that protects the economic interests of the propertied class. For Marx, the so-called Asiatic mode of production thus presented an anomaly (Godelier 1977:119; Moseley and Wallerstein 1978:265). In these agrarian empires, land remained collectively owned at the local level, but the center extracted tribute and taxes from the peasantry. The ability to control people's labor under such circumstances did not rest on controlling the means of production, but on controlling other resources, tangible and intan-

gible. As Godelier (1978) has pointed out, the Inca emperor's claim to be an incarnation of the Sun God was not mere superstructural overlay, but essential to his power. Some of the tangible sources of chiefly and kingly power, we have pointed out here, include also luxury goods that reward a coterie of clients who are themselves patrons of others at lower levels of an authoritative chain. Orthodox Marxist views, which have conceptualized the sources of power narrowly as the control of productive property, have thus misconstrued the nature of precapitalist inequality.

World systems theory, by depicting economy and polity as non-isomorphic, suggests that the internal dynamics of class and power in a polity are not an encapsulated system. Unlike Wallerstein, however, we suspect this non-isomorphism was as true of precapitalist economies as capitalist ones. We agree with Schneider (1977) that the trade in luxury goods in precapitalist chiefdoms and empires had far-reaching effects. Chiefdoms or early states would have been tempted to protect if not monopolize trade whenever possible while at the same time expanding this basis of power. The increasing scale of both market and empire made specialization of function inevitable. In expanding empires, specialized merchants and the market would have become a competitive locus of power as seen by a political/military elite (Friedman and Rowlands 1978; Wallerstein 1974; Weber 1976; Wolf 1959:141).

These issues impinge directly on an old controversy in anthropological discussions of state formation, whether stratification precedes or incidentally accompanies the state (Jones and Kautz 1981; Wright 1977). Fried (1967), the primary exponent of the Marxist view, sees the state as a defensive ploy against the inevitable class conflict arising from unequal access to basic resources. He has thus insisted that stratification logically precedes the state, despite the absence of any confirming, historic, archeological, or ethnographic example. Service (1962, 1975), the primary exponent of a functionalist theory of state formation, has argued that stratification merely accompanies and at times lags behind state formation. He views chiefly centralization as a boon to efficient organization, and stratification as a consequence of differential political authority.

Carniero (1981) has argued persuasively that both Fried and Service misapprehend the political-economies out of which states emerged: chiefdoms. Fried's levels of political evolution did not specify chiefdoms at all, proposing instead a category of "ranked" societies that encompasses an organizational range wider than chiefdoms (1967). Service (1962, 1975), who did elaborate the significance of chiefdoms, misunderstood that significance as resting in the economically functional benefits of redistribution. All three of these, including Carniero (who envisions resource competition, warfare, and slavery as the key variables—1970; 1981), insufficiently understand the political centrality of luxury goods and the consequences of economic networks that stretch beyond chiefly polities. For these reasons they cannot account sufficiently for how rank and redistribution turn into extractive exploitation.

It seems likely that stratification accompanied more often than preceded state formation, but it does not follow that the former was merely incidental to the latter. The transition from chiefdom to state is effected through the actions of men working to gain or protect superior privileges, and if inequality in chiefdoms does not yet entail significant differences in standard of living between leaders and followers, or differential control of the means of production, such differences are already in the making. When to the sources of chiefly inequality is added the possibility that power and its symbols may be purchased, economic exploitation and stratification would seem inevitable.

Because of the way the market runs ahead of power, however, it is not a simple matter of the state and the propertied class working in harmonic synchrony for their mutual benefit. Much of the dynamic in the formation and reproduction of state polities probably lies in that tension between the market and the palace. The relationship between the state and the market or the state and property is by turns symbiotic and competitive, protective and threatening. Gledhill and Larsen (1982), criticizing Polanyi's vision of "archaic" states, suggest that some kinds of private land ownership always existed in Mesopotamia alongside an economy controlled from the center, and trade by entrepreneurs alongside

exchanges controlled by temple or palace. They assert, "It is precisely the interplay of centralization and bureaucratic features on the one hand and decentralization and the private economy on the other that is likely to provide us with a better understanding of long-term developmental patterns in Mesopotamian history" (Gledhill and Larsen 1982:213).

We have used the disruptive effects of trade diasporas in chiefdoms to explore the impact of the market in the emergence of secondary states, but the role of the market in the emergence of pristine states should well be reexamined in similar terms. At first chiefs are drawn into the long-distance *trade* in luxury goods to procure the symbols of power and the "currency" to become patrons and allies. No doubt they find themselves stuck to a golden goose they cannot fully control. As the market increasingly threatens the traditional foundations of chiefly power, chiefs must increasingly attempt to control if not monopolize trade. The same force of arms that makes that control possible can be used to wage warfare without and to extract greater tributes within. When leadership is undermined by a market blind to everything except profits, policies of systematic impoverishment are as essential to leaders as armies. Economic exploitation joins tyranny, and so states are born.

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